1994 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

11-1-1994

Gasoline Sales, Inc. v. Aero Oil Co., et al.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994

Recommended Citation
"Gasoline Sales, Inc. v. Aero Oil Co., et al." (1994). 1994 Decisions. 174.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/174

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 1994 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
N0. 93-7555
GASOLINE SALES, INC.
Appellant
v.
....

AERO OIL COMPANY; GETTY PETROLEUM CORPORATION;
JERRY T. LANK; ALVIN SMITH; RECO PETROLEUM, INC.

On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 92-01771)
Argued March 1, 1994
BEFORE:

STAPLETON and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges, and
SMITH, District Judge*

(Opinion Filed November 1, 1994)

Frederick J. Fanelli (Argued)
221 Mahantongo Street
Pottsville, PA 17901
Attorney for Appellant
Joseph M. Hankins (Argued)
Joseph A. Dougherty
BRITT, HANKINS, SCHAIBLE & MOUGHAN
Two Penn Center Plaza
Suite 515
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Attorneys for Appellees
*Honorable D. Brooks Smith, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

OPINION OF THE COURT

STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:

Gasoline Sales, Inc. ("Gas Sales") sued three related
corporations and officers of two of the corporations.

Gas Sales

alleged that the defendants injured Gas Sales in the course of
violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
("RICO") chapter of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-68.

The district court dismissed Gas Sales'

second amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Gas Sales appeals from this dismissal.

It also appeals from the

district court's ruling refusing to grant it leave to file a
third amended complaint.

The primary question raised on appeal

is whether Gas Sales has satisfied the "person/enterprise"
pleading requirement which we have held applies in RICO suits
premised on 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

See B.F. Hirsch v. Enright

Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1984).

We hold that Gas

Sales has failed to satisfy this requirement, and we will
therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.
A.
Because the district court dismissed Gas Sales' second
amended complaint at the pleading stage pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), we must consider whether relief could be granted to Gas
Sales "under any set of facts that could be proved consistent
with the allegations" in its complaint.

National Organization

For Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 798, 803
(1994) quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).
The relevant allegations are as follows.
The defendants are a corporation, Getty Petroleum Corp.
("Getty"); Getty's two wholly-owned subsidiaries, Aero Oil
Company ("Aero"), and Reco Petroleum, Inc. ("Reco"); Getty's
senior vice-president, Alvin Smith; and Aero's general manager,
Jerry T. Lank.

Getty, Aero, and Reco are engaged in the leasing

of retail gasoline stations and the sale of petroleum products.
Getty acquired Aero in 1986, and acquired Reco on June 30, 1989.
Getty originally was incorporated under the name of
Power Test Corporation ("Power Test"), but changed its name in
1985.

Between 1982 and 1985, Getty -- then called Power Test --

violated New York State statutes by defrauding 182 New York
gasoline-station lessees.

In 1986, the New York Attorney General

filed a civil suit against Getty on behalf of the 182 lessees.
Getty settled the suit for a large monetary payment.
In 1990, in the District Court for the Eastern District
of New York, a Getty subdivision named Getty Terminals Corp.

(which is not a party to this lawsuit) was convicted of tax
evasion and conspiracy to defraud the United States.
From 1986 to 1991, in Pennsylvania and Maryland, the
defendants have engaged in a widespread fraudulent scheme,
through the use of both mail and wire communications, to induce
the plaintiff Gas Sales and at least twenty others to enter into
retail-gasoline-station lease-agreements with the defendants.
Once the lessees entered into the contracts, the defendants would
embark on a course of fraudulent conduct designed to render the
retail gasoline-stations unprofitable and thereby "squeeze" the
lessees out of business.
B.
The district court had jurisdiction over Gas Sales'
complaint pursuant to RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).

We have

jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.
A.
In 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), RICO provides a private civil
right of action to "any person injured . . . by reason of a
violation of" the substantive RICO provisions contained in 18
U.S.C. § 1962.

Gas Sales alleges that it was injured by

violations of one of these substantive provisions -- section
1962(c).

A "person" violates section 1962(c) by conducting an

"enterprise" through a pattern of racketeering activity.1
Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
"Racketeering activity" is defined by RICO as any of a host of
enumerated crimes, including mail and wire fraud.
§ 1961(1).

18 U.S.C.

"Pattern" is defined as the commission of at least

two acts of "racketeering activity" within a ten-year period.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
The parties do not dispute whether Gas Sales has
alleged facts sufficient to satisfy the "racketeering" and
"pattern" elements of a section 1962(c) violation.

They dispute

whether Gas Sales has alleged facts sufficient to establish that
any of the defendants engaged in the "conduct of an enterprise."
Since B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628 (3d Cir.
1984), we have held that to plead a claim successfully under
section 1962(c), a complaint must be capable of being read to
allege that a "person" was "conducting a pattern of racketeering
through a separate and distinct enterprise."

Glessner v. Kenny,

952 F.2d 702, 714 (3d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added); see also Banks
v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418, 421 (3d Cir. 1990); Kehr Packages, Inc. v.
Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1411 (3d Cir. 1991); Brittingham
1

.
In its entirety, section 1962(c) states: "It shall be
unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection
of unlawful debt."

v. Mobil Corp., 943 F.2d 297, 300 (3d Cir. 1991); Lorenz v. CSX
Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1413 & n.4; Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco
Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1191 (3d Cir. 1993).
Gas Sales has pled that Getty, Lank, and Smith were
"persons" who conducted the "enterprise" or "enterprises" of Aero
and Reco.2

RICO's definitions of "person" and "enterprise" are

quite broad.

Each includes human beings and legal entities, and

"enterprise" also includes unofficial "associations" of human
beings and/or legal entities.3

Thus, in RICO terms, any of the

defendants could be a "person," and any of the defendants or any
combination of the defendants could be an "enterprise."

However,

under our precedents, none of the defendants is sufficiently
distinct from the "enterprises" Aero and Reco to have conducted
them within the meaning of section 1962(c).
1.
Only "persons" can be sued for violating RICO
§ 1962(c).

Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of North America, 824

F.2d 1349, 1358 n.* (3d Cir. 1987).

Because Gas Sales has

alleged that Aero and Reco were conducted as "enterprises" in
violation of section 1962(c), and because we have held that
enterprises cannot conduct themselves within the meaning of
2

. Gas Sales has not stated whether it alleges Reco and Aero
constitute one or two enterprises.
3

. "Person" is defined to "include[ ] any individual entity
capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."
18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). "Enterprise" is defined to "include[ ] any
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).

section 1962(c), Gas Sales cannot sue Aero or Reco under section
1962(c).

B.F. Hirsch v. Enright, 751 F.2d at 633-34; Banks v.

Wolk, 918 F.2d at 421; Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 1411.

For the

same reason, Aero cannot be vicariously liable for any 1962(c)
violation committed by Lank, its vice president, in conducting
Aero through a pattern of racketeering.

Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at

1351, 1358-60; Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 1411.
2.
We have also held that a corporation generally cannot
be a defendant under section 1962(c) for conducting an
"enterprise" consisting of its own subsidiaries or employees, or
consisting of the corporation itself in association with its
subsidiaries or employees.

Brittingham, 943 F.2d at 302-03;

Glessner, 952 F.2d at 710-13; Lorenz, 1 F.3d at 1411-13.

This is

because we have interpreted corporate identity expansively, so
that the actions of a corporation's agents conducting its normal
affairs are constructively its own actions for section 1962(c)
purposes.
710-12.

Brittingham, 943 F.2d at 302; Glessner, 952 F.2d at
Under this "Brittingham rationale," Getty cannot be sued

by Gas Sales for conducting its subsidiaries Aero and Reco any
more than it could be sued for conducting itself.
We have hypothesized that a "narrow," "theoretical,"
and "rare" exception to the Brittingham rule might exist, when
there are allegations that the defendant corporation "had a role
in the racketeering activity that was distinct from the
undertakings of those acting on its behalf."

Brittingham, 943

F.2d at 302; see also Glessner, 952 F.2d at 712; Lorenz, 1. F.3d

at 1413 n.4.

Gas Sales has not so alleged, however.

As the

district court accurately recounted, Gas Sales has alleged that
Getty and its two subsidiaries acted in concert in furtherance of
a common scheme to defraud gasoline station lessees.

Gas Sales'

complaints, far from distinguishing Getty's role in the scheme,
closely identify Getty's actions with the actions of Aero and
Reco.
3.
We have held that corporate employees who victimize
their employer by draining it of its own money or using it as a
passive tool to extract money from third parties are proper
section 1962(c) defendants.

Glessner, 952 F.2d at 713.

Where

the employees merely participate in the corporation's own fraud
by acting as corporate agents, however, the employees may not be
sued under section 1962(c).

Id. at 713-14.

We have stated that

this interpretation of 1962(c) "avoids the absurd result that a
corporation may always be pled to be the enterprise controlled by
its employees or officers."

Id. at 713.

Gas Sales has not alleged that Smith and Lank profited
personally from the conducting of Getty, Aero, or Reco's affairs
beyond the compensation they receive for their services to the
corporation or that they acted as anything other than Getty and
Aero's agents.

Gas Sales therefore cannot sue Smith and Lank

under section 1962(c).

B.
The third amended (i.e. fourth) complaint that Gas
Sales seeks to file, minimizes any allegation of an active
racketeering role by the subsidiaries Aero and Reco, and also
includes a new legal theory of liability for violation of RICO
§ 1962(b).4

The district court refused to permit the filing of

the amendment because it was repetitive, or, in the alternative,
because it was futile.

This was not an abuse of discretion.

See

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Lorenz, 1 F.3d at 141314; Glessner, 952 F.2d at 714.
First, as the district court stated, "three attempts at
a proper pleading is enough," and a "plaintiff has to carefully
consider the allegations to be placed in a complaint before it is
filed."

Dist. Ct. Mem. Op. at 12.

Gas Sales is not seeking to

add claims it inadvertently omitted from its prior complaints or
which it did not know about earlier.

Rather, Gas Sales is

modifying its allegations in hopes of remedying factual
deficiencies in its prior pleadings, even to the point of
contradicting its prior pleadings.
Second, regarding Gas Sales' section 1962(c) theory of
liability, the third amended complaint still contains sufficient
4

. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) states: "It shall be unlawful for any
person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly
or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which
is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce." Anyone injured by reason of a violation of
section 1962(b), may sue the violator pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c).

allegations of concerted behavior by Getty, Aero, and Reco that
it fails to establish that Getty played a distinctive and
separate role in the alleged racketeering activity.
Finally, regarding section 1962(b), we have not yet
decided whether the "person/enterprise" distinction is a
necessary element of a violation of that section.
Lube, 4 F.3d at 1190-91.

Lightning

Nonetheless, we need not resolve the

issue now, because proof of a violation of that section requires
a showing that the plaintiff was injured by the defendant's
acquisition or control of an interest in an enterprise through
racketeering.

Id. at 1189-91.

Gas Sales does not allege in its

third amended complaint that it was injured by Getty's
acquisition or maintenance of control over Aero and Reco, or that
Getty's acquisition or maintenance of control over these
subsidiaries was accomplished through racketeering.

It would be

futile, therefore, to permit Gas Sales to file its third amended
complaint on section 1962(b) grounds.

III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court will be affirmed.

